A white paper being disseminated through the U.S. Department of War calls on Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and top officials to adopt a broader aircraft system to replace older fleets and better aid NATO partners while sending a stronger message to adversaries, Military.com^[1] has learned.

The document, shared with Military.com^[2] by a source familiar with the matter, encourages the U.S. to adopt a Gulfstream G550‑based Conformal Airborne Early Warning (CAEW) platform already fielded by Israel and Italy as “a combat-proven complementary solution.” The equivalent in the United States is known as the EA-37B, an Air Force electronic warfare aircraft nicknamed “Compass Call” that uses the modified airframe of a G550 business jet but with a sensor package developed by BAE Systems.

Military.com^[3] reached out to the Pentagon for comment.

The G550 model aligns with NATO’s 5% defense pledge and the 24-month Rapid Adoption Action Plan (RAAP), endorsed in June and which strives to accelerate the adoption of allies’ new defense technology, per the document.

NATO “is entering a decisive moment in airborne command and control,” the document notes, acknowledging that future architectures extending toward broader, multidomain information integration are required for modernity and properly meeting the demands of high-threat environments.

The document is reportedly moving to the desk of Hegseth, who according to sources has not yet been made privy to the document.

Boeing Remains Committed

Calls for a revamped system come as multiple NATO countries announced Thursday that they will not acquire six Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft viewed as successors to Boeing E-3As—now used as AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) aircraft with an expected shelf life lasting until 2035.

“Boeing remains fully committed to NATO and allied nations’ airborne early warning and control needs,” a Boeing spokesperson told Military.com. “The E-7A is the most capable and mature AEW&C platform fielded today, with combat-proven capabilities, interoperability with alliance systems, and a ready industrial and sustainment framework to meet operational timelines.”

A Boeing official noted how In November 2023, the Boeing E-7A was selected as the only capability that meets or exceeds the airborne early warning and control requirements identified by NATO Allies.

Less Money, Better Safety

The document circulating through the Department of War calls for a NATO‑owned, European-led business jet fleet, structured under the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). It could be jointly funded and operated to avoid current bottlenecks.

That translates to a global supply chain procuring and modifying aircraft faster than current programs allow, while also allowing for phased growth without redesigns. It would supposedly reduce sustainment costs and minimize future upgrades.

For example, a 6-8 member crew would operate a G550 at a cost of about $6,000 per hour, over a period of 8-10 hours and in a craft with higher survivability against threats.

That’s compared to a 12-14 member crew of an E7 operating at the approximate cost of $20,000 per hour, over a period of 10-12 hours and in a craft with moderate survivability against threats. The E-3 crew, described as a craft with low survivability costs a 16-20 member crew roughly $30,000 over an 8-10 hour period.

Air Solution

“This is a European-led solution in execution,” the paper states. “While the baseline airframes and some mission systems draw from U.S. and Israeli programs, conversion, certification, sustainment, and mission software can—and should—be conducted in Europe.

“That ensures political ownership, creates workshare for European industry, and opens opportunities for regional AI/ML and systems suppliers. Politically, a NATO‑owned G550 fleet would demonstrate cost-conscious burden sharing and turn the 5% pledge into tangible capability.”

Such a transition would also quantify NATO’s ability to rapidly innovate, providing reassurance to the public and a strong message of deterrence to adversaries.

“By leveraging an existing platform and allied industrial capacity, NATO can deliver a layered airborne C2 solution that complements the E‑7, enhances resilience, expands under-resourced mission areas, and proves the alliance can innovate at the speed of relevance,” the document says.

'Several Critical Gaps'

The Gulfstream G550 can close C2 gaps, per the document, and offers advantages in areas including survivability and agility, reducing vulnerability of the aircraft; improving coverage; maintaining human capital and expertise to work on newer systems; and could better be integrated across all domains.

While the E‑7 will modernize NATO’s airborne battle management, the document mentions “several critical gaps” that have been “repeatedly highlighted by senior commanders.”

They include vulnerability not just to surface‑to‑air missiles and long‑range fires but also to asymmetric threats from low-cost drones. It also describes how coverage over the High North, Baltics, Central Europe, and Black Sea is “unfeasible” with E‑7s.

There’s also concern about the timeline to have E-7s produced and distributed with the current timeline extending into the 2030s, which could leave the U.S. and NATO allies in limbo as E-3s simultaneously phase out of rotation.

“NATO’s airborne battle management advantage is at a crossroads,” the document states. “Choosing the E‑7 Wedgetail to succeed AWACS was a vital step; it is not enough. A complementary, proven platform is required to close NATO’s gaps in AEW and related mission sets.

“Distributed across Europe, it would harden wartime resilience and expand peacetime training opportunities, strengthening tomorrow’s readiness now—not a decade from now.”

NATO Partners Seek 'Alternatives'

The Netherlands are one of six NATO nations “now exploring alternatives for fleet replacement and seeking new partners,” according to a statement released by the Dutch Ministry of Defense.

In June, a senior U.S. military official announced the country’s withdrawal from the AWACS replacement program and effectively removed itself from providing strategic and financial assistance to partners. NATO has been using AWACS since 1982.

“The department is canceling the E-7 Wedgetail program due to significant delays with cost increases from $588 million to $724 million per aircraft and survivability concerns in a contested environment while investing in alternate solutions including space-based capabilities and adding additional E-2D aircraft,” the official said at the time.

The Dutch MoD said in a statement Thursday that under the previous program, both the strategic and financial foundations were lost which resulted in halting the acquisition of the E-7.

The NATO members are “now exploring alternatives for fleet replacement and seeking new partners,” per the statement.

"The goal remains to have other, quieter aircraft operational by 2035," Dutch State Defense Secretary Gijs Tuinman said. "The U.S. withdrawal also demonstrates the importance of investing as much as possible in European industry."

NATO chief Mark Rutte on Thursday signaled the urgency to "speed up” on figuring out replacements.

Military.com^[4] reached out to the Dutch MoD and NATO for comment.

When workers at the Pentagon quietly removed “Department of Defense” plaques and replaced them with new bronze signs reading “Department of War,” the reaction was immediate. Photos of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth installing a 60-pound “Department of War” plaque spread across social media within hours. Supporters praised the symbolism. Critics argued it sent the wrong signal to allies and adversaries.

But behind the headlines, the change raises a deeper question—how much power does a name really have? And when it comes to America’s most important military institution, does renaming the Department of Defense^[1] actually matter?

This story is about psychology, strategy, culture, and cost, all wrapped in a single word.

Why the Pentagon’s Name Change Is Back in the Spotlight

President Trump’s September executive order^[2] directed the Pentagon to “revert to its historic name,” though Congress would still need to update the title in federal law^[3]. Soon after, Pentagon workers took down the old DoD signs and installed “Department of War” plaques at two major entrances. Hegseth said the rebrand restores a clarity of purpose tied to winning wars.

But the change isn’t just semantic. According to congressional staff and independent analysts, a full rebrand, from IT systems to global basing signage, could cost up to $2 billion. For comparison, renaming Army and Air Force bases that previously honored Confederate officers cost $62 million across nine installations (Naming Commission final report).

If renaming nine bases costs $62 million, imagine renaming an entire global defense enterprise. The Pentagon hasn’t released its own cost figure yet. But experts agree the price tag will not be small.

The Psychology Behind a Name Change

If this debate sounds symbolic, it is. But symbols can shape how institutions think and act.

Psychologists call this priming—the idea that language triggers mental models long before people make decisions. A name is a frame. It signals who you are and what you do.

• “Defense” suggests protection, stability, deterrence, and partnership.
• “War” suggests offense, aggression, kinetic force, confrontation.

This is what linguist George Lakoff calls linguistic framing: words activate metaphors, metaphors activate emotions, and emotions influence behavior. For an organization as large as the Pentagon, a name shapes strategic identity.

The War Department’s name changed to the Department of Defense in 1949 because the U.S. was entering a world defined by alliances, nuclear deterrence, and global stability—not constant open conflict. That shift was strategic.

Reverting to “War” sends a different message about America’s role today.

Could the Name Change Influence U.S. Military Behavior?

Names don’t issue orders. They don’t mobilize troops or authorize funding. But names can influence how leaders interpret threats and justify actions. They shape public opinion, political rhetoric, and internal culture.

A “Department of War” could subtly frame global competition in more confrontational terms. Studies in cognitive psychology and strategic communication show that lexical choices influence risk perception. Words like “war,” “fight,” and “enemy” create sharper mental boundaries than words like “defense,” “security,” or “stability.”

It doesn’t mean the U.S. becomes more aggressive just because of a sign change, but it does shift the psychological baseline. And in Washington, baselines matter.

What It Could Cost to Rename the Department

Renaming the Pentagon is not like swapping out a building placard.

The department’s name is embedded in thousands of systems and agreements, including:

• IT networks and cybersecurity certificates
• Digital forms, procurement language, and acquisition regulations
• Diplomatic agreements and NATO standardization documents
• Global basing signage at 4,800 facilities
• Military education materials and doctrine
• Public-facing websites, recruitment platforms, and branding

Congressional aides estimate the global rebrand could approach $2 billion when all indirect changes are included.  And it won’t happen overnight.

Every partner nation with a U.S. defense agreement, from Japan to Poland to the Philippines, would have to update documentation referring to “the Department of Defense.” That’s decades of treaties, MOUs, and operational frameworks.

The 2021–2023 base renamings provide a clear example of scope: nine bases, $62 million, and months of planning. The Pentagon is exponentially larger.

Military Culture: Why Language Is Never Just Language

The U.S. military is built on symbols—patches, mottos, call signs, unit heritage. Language reinforces identity. A title like “commander” versus “manager” carries weight. Marines aren’t “employees”; they are “Marines.”

The Pentagon’s name is part of that cultural story.

Changing it reshapes not just outward messaging but internal mindset:

• How leaders talk about missions
• How troops imagine the purpose of service
• How policymakers explain national security
• How the public interprets America’s posture in the world

A name becomes part of the cultural narrative.  And culture—more than any budget—drives how institutions think.

Supporters say it restores ‘clarity.’ Critics say it signals aggression.

Supporters of “Department of War” argue:

• It is more honest about the military’s purpose.
• It reinforces a mindset focused on winning, not managing.
• Rivals like China, Russia, and Iran will better understand U.S. resolve.

Critics counter:

• It may signal unnecessary aggression to allies.
• It oversimplifies the military’s modern mission set (cyber defense, space operations, humanitarian relief).
• It risks escalating tensions by emphasizing conflict over deterrence.

Inside the Pentagon, some leaders have raised concerns that the new name could complicate basing rights and diplomatic agreements, where “defense” carries a softer connotation than “war.”

The debate is not just semantic—it’s strategic.

The Public’s Reaction Reveals a Generational Divide

A new Reuters/Ipsos poll tracking public attitudes toward recent national security shifts found broad disagreement over the administration’s more aggressive security posture (Reuters polling). While the poll did not directly ask about the name change, the results show Americans are sharply split on how forcefully the military should act.

Among service members and veterans, reactions are mixed as well:

• Some welcome the return to a “fighting spirit.”
• Others say the change does not reflect the realities of modern operations.

The split mirrors a broader generational divide in how Americans define military power: through overwhelming force, or through alliance management and deterrence.

A Look Back: The Last Time America Changed the Name

The U.S. created the Department of War in 1789 to oversee the Army. After World War II, the Truman administration reorganized the national security apparatus into the National Military Establishment, and in 1949 renamed it the Department of Defense.

That 1949 change was intentional: it symbolized a shift from winning wars to preventing them. The current push to restore “War” may symbolize the reverse.

So…Does It Matter?

This is where the debate becomes bigger than politics. Names matter because they tell a story.

They signal how a nation sees itself.
They influence how institutions behave.
They shape how allies interpret American actions.
They affect how adversaries calculate risk.

A “Department of Defense” suggests a commitment to stability. A “Department of War” suggests readiness for direct confrontation.

Neither is inherently good nor bad. Both reflect strategic worldviews. But the difference is not small. Not at this moment in history. The renaming debate forces the country to ask:

What story should America tell about its military today?

Is it the story of a nation defending the system it built? Or the story of a nation preparing for the conflicts it expects?

At a time of global volatility—from the Western Pacific to the Middle East to cyberspace—names shape perceptions long before strategy does. In national security, perception is power.

And sometimes, a name is not just a name, it’s a declaration.